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Introduction
 
The central thesis of
P
 
ANKSEPP
 
 and P
 
ANKSEPP
 
(2001, henceforth, P&P)
is that there are no spe-
cially evolved, higher-or-
der domain-specific
cognitive mechanisms to
speak of. Apart from the
basic D
 
ARWINIAN
 
 emo-
tions (fear, surprise, an-
ger, sadness, joy, disgust),
so-called cognitive ‘mod-
ules’ are more likely “the
product of dubious hu-
man ambition rather
than sound scientific rea-
soning”. What evolution-
ary psychologists (as well
as many cognitive and
developmental psycholo-
gists) take to be modular
structures are actually the
epigenetic products of
the ancestral emotional
functions of the brain
(rooted in what was once
called “the limbic sys-
tem,” M
 
AC
 
L
 
EAN
 
 1990)
and more recent “gen-
eral-purpose brain mech-
anisms”. In more than a dozen places, P&P repeat as
mantra that empirical evidence indicates the mod-
ern human mind was created through the dual
functioning of subcortical mammalian emotions
and a neocortical general-purpose computational
device. Furthermore, this highly flexible, all-pur-
pose intelligence probably emerged “more rapidly
via group selection than by individual selection”. 
There is much to commend the cautionary tale
that P&P tell regarding possible excesses of sociobi-
ological speculation, including what are arguably
‘just-so’ stories about modularized adaptations for
rape (T
 
HORNHILL
 
/P
 
ALMER
 
2000), homicide (B
 
USS
 
1999) and emotional dis-
orders such as depression
(N
 
ESSE
 
/L
 
LOYD
 
 1992).
P&P’s position on the de-
rivative and epigenetic
character of ‘secondary’
or ‘social’ emotions (guilt,
love, empathy, etc.), is
also defensible (e.g., D
 
AM-
ASIO
 
 1994), although seri-
ously debatable (cf.
L
 
E
 
D
 
OUX
 
 1996; G
 
RIFFITHS
 
1997). Finally, P&P’s take
on the current, overly-
funded fad for neuroim-
aging (driven more by
technological innovation
and the industry it sup-
ports than by any theoret-
ical insight) is credible.
There can no more be a
theory directly derived
from observations of neu-
roimaging than there can
be a theory derived di-
rectly from observations
of meter readings; it is
only in the service of
some prior abstract the-
ory that such observa-
tions can make sense. Nevertheless, there is no em-
pirical evidence whatever to indicate that P&P’s
central thesis is true, and much to suggest it is false.
 
Evolutionary Psychology: 
No Explanatory Value for 
Higher-Order Cognition (Yet)
 
To-date, evolutionary psychology has not predicted
or discovered any significant or surprising aspect of
language or higher-order cognitive devices of the
sort I describe below. But this does not mean that all
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The case for evolved cognitive modules rests on sever-
al converging lines of evidence: Functional design
(analogy), ethology (homology), universality, precoci-
ty of acquisition, independence from perceptual expe-
rience (poverty of stimulus), selective pathology
(cerebral impairment), resistance to inhibition (hyper-
activity), ease of cultural transmission. No factor may
be necessary but evidence for all or some is compel-
ling, if not conclusive, for domains like folkmechan-
ics, folkbiology, folkpsychology. By constrast, no
empirical evidence supports P
 
ANKSEPP
 
 and P
 
ANKSEPP
 
’s
central thesis: that what evolutionary psychologists
(and many cognitive and developmental psycholo-
gists) consider modular structures are actually epige-
netic products of subcortical mammalian emotions
and neocortical general-purpose computations. Argu-
ably, no significant empirical discovery about lan-
guage or other higher-order cognitive structures yet
owes to inquiries about evolutionary origins and func-
tions. Nevertheless, adopting evolutionary psycholo-
gy’s requirement that candidate exaptations and
spandrels be described, as far as possible, in connec-
tion with evolved adaptations, opens new avenues for
exploring and testing modular designs.
Modularity, domain-specificity, language, folkpsy-
chology, folkbiology.
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Key words
 Evolution and Cognition
 
❘
 
2
 
❘
 
2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
Scott Atran
 
evolutionary psychology accounts are ‘just-so’ sto-
ries. The best account of language as an evolution-
ary adaptation centers on the claim that “language
shows signs of design for the communication of
propositional structures over a serial channel”
(P
 
INKER
 
/B
 
LOOM
 
 1990). P
 
INKER
 
 and B
 
LOOM
 
 describe
how specific syntactic structures conform to this
language-specific design in ways that provide func-
tional advantage: for example, through certain
structure-dependent rules (phrase structure) and
principles of embedding (recursion) that allow the
formulation and expression of infinitely many dis-
crete ideas by finite and few means. This enables the
multiple thoughts of multiple individuals to be
combined, tested in imagination and consequently
included or excluded from having a role in some fu-
ture action. A population whose individuals could
contemplate alternative scenarios in any sequence
and at any rate, benefit from the cognitive travails
of others, and let conjectures die instead of them-
selves, would surely have had an evolutionary ad-
vantage over a population that couldn’t. 
P
 
INKER
 
 and B
 
LOOM
 
 offer a well-reasoned and often
nonobvious analysis of evolutionary tradeoffs in-
volved in opting for linear communication through
an auditory medium: visual displays better commu-
nicate highly complex topological relationships (“a
picture is worth a thousand words”), gestures better
convey emotion, and language is inefficient trans-
mitting information about taste or smell. For all its
insight and plausibility, though, P
 
INKER
 
 and B
 
LOOM
 
’s
account remains wholly backward-looking: no
structural discovery, novel prediction or theoretical
breakthrough ensues within the C
 
HOMSKYEAN
 
 frame-
work that the authors adopt. 
According to Jerry F
 
ODOR
 
 (1998), whose reasoning
is close to C
 
HOMSKY
 
’s (1988, p170), it is not likely that
natural selection gradually produced an adaptive
mutation for a language instinct. Rather, selection
pressures unrelated to language simply made human
brains a little larger and more complex. Unlike grad-
ual and incremental adaptations, a little added com-
plexity can go a long way fast to produce multiple
novel structures: 
“Make the giraffe’s neck just a little bit longer and
you correspondingly increase, just by a little, the an-
imal’s capacity to reach the fruit at the top of the
tree… But make an ape’s brain just a little bigger (or
denser, or more folded, or, who knows, grayer) and
it’s anybody’s guess what happens to the creature’s
behavioural repertoire”. (F
 
ODOR
 
 1998).
Much ink has spilled and acrimony vetted in the
debate between evolutionary psychologists and the
scientists who criticize them. In the case of language,
however, no empirical issue has yet to turn on the
debate. Despite very different evolutionary stories,
C
 
HOMSKY
 
, F
 
ODOR
 
, P
 
INKER
 
 and B
 
LOOM
 
 fundamentally
agree on the specific computational structures that
characterize language, on its innateness, on its
highly specialized mode of operation (modularity)
and on the fact that all of this is uniquely the product
of evolution, whether adaptation or by-product.
 
The Language Module
 
From a purely logical standpoint, if a mind is able to
take fragmentary instances of experience (relative to
the richness and complexity of the whole data set)
and spontaneously predict (project, generalize) the
extension of those scattered cases to an indefinitely
large class of intricately related cases, then the infer-
ential structure responsible for this prediction can-
not possibly derive from the experience. As Hume
noted, the structure must be prior to experience,
just like the cranes and architects used for construct-
ing buildings must exist prior to initial construc-
tion: a building does not just build itself. There is no
other possibility. What, then, are the physical possi-
bilities for a mental structure to be “prior to experi-
ence”? 
One could hold with S
 
OCRATES
 
 or B
 
UDDHA
 
 that
people are born with a past-life ‘memory’ for the
structure of experience they will encounter later in
life; or, one could hold with Thomas Aquinas or Kant
that God put structure in people’s minds. If, how-
ever, one accepts humans as biological creatures
whose species attributes emerged through the same
evolutionary processes that govern the emergence of
all other species, then there appears to be no alterna-
tive to a priori mental structures being evolved bio-
logical structures (whether as adaptations or by-
products of adaptations). To say an evolved biologi-
cal structure is ‘innate’ is not to say that every impor-
tant aspect of its phenotypic expression is ‘geneti-
cally determined’. Biologically poised structures
channel development, but do not determine it—like
mountains that channel scattered rain into the same
mountain–valley river basin (W
 
ADDINGTON
 
 1959). 
P&P might grant all this, but argue that an all-
purpose, domain-general computational device suf-
fices to give the mind/brain inferential power be-
yond the information given. As an empirical claim,
this entails that one should be able to deduce the
structural principles and parameters governing any
specific domain from general purpose-structures act-
ing under the constraints of experience in the rele-
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vant domain. For example, P&P offer that language
“may be closely linked to anterior cingulate and ad-
jacent frontal lobe tissues which appear to mediate
certain types of pain, feelings of separation distress
and thereby social sensitivities” (M
 
AC
 
L
 
EAN
 
 1990).
But there is nothing in what we know of general
intelligence (e.g., conditioning, association, etc.),
pain, distress, social sensitivity, or the structures of
anterior cingulate and adjacent frontal lobe tissues,
to even remotely hint at the highly structured, and
structurally peculiar, principles and parameters of
human language. This includes: anaphora (the struc-
tural constraints on how even widely separated parts
of an expression co-refer), quantification (the struc-
tural constraints that ‘who,’ ‘many,’ few,’ etc. im-
pose on the syntactic behavior of subjects and ob-
jects), negation (it is literally impossible to learn
negation through perceived experience or ‘interac-
tion,’ as one cannot perceive or interact with some-
thing that isn’t), word order (all languages have a
specified 
 
linear
 
 order linking 
 
arguments to predicates
 
),
and so forth. 
Briefly, the central tenet of C
 
HOMSKY
 
’s (2000) ap-
proach is that there is a language system, LS, of the
human brain. LS reflexively discriminates and cate-
gorizes parts of the flux of human experience as ‘lan-
guage,’ and develops complex abilities to infer and
interpret this highly structured, and structurally pe-
culiar, type of human production. In a general sense,
there is nothing intrinsically different about LS—in
terms of innateness, evolution or universality—than
the visual system (VS), immune system (IS), respira-
tory system (RS), or any other complex biological
system. Learning syntactic structure through ‘social
interaction’ is no more plausible an alternative than
learning by ‘osmosis’. If a child is initially deprived
of linguistic input, the child may never come to ac-
quire, or ‘know,’ much in the way of language, just
as a kitten initially deprived of normal exposure to
the visual world may never come to ‘know’ much by
way of object recognition (H
 
UBEL
 
 1988). Still, emo-
tion and social interaction no more ‘create’ language
in the child’s mind than lighting and object pattern-
ing ‘create’ vision in the kitten. 
 
Interacting Modules
 
LS is no more (or less) ‘autonomous’ from the sur-
rounding social environment, or from other mental
systems, than VS is detachable from surrounding
light and object patterning or from other physical
systems (including, in humans, linguistic and other
cognitive systems of meaning, M
 
ARR
 
 1982). LS and
VS do not exist, and cannot develop, in isolation,
but only as subsystems of even more intricate struc-
tures. Thus, claims about the biological ‘autonomy’
or ‘modularity’ of LS or VS refer only to a specifiable
level of systemic functioning within a system hier-
archy. A difficult empirical issue concerns the ex-
tent to which other cognitive ‘performance’ systems
are themselves specifically adapted for language.
There is little doubt that the sound system is highly
structured for access (psycholinguistic experiments
with neonates and even fetuses, dichotic listening
experiments, comparative phonology, and so forth
are compelling). The interface between syntactic
and semantic systems is much more obscure. Specu-
lation is rampant, debate is furious, and critical ex-
periments are few, as might be expected from a
relatively new and dynamically changing science.
But progress is being made, slowly and laboriously,
as intense research by teams of well-trained investi-
gators continues. 
Cognitive and developmental psychologists and
psycholinguistics have identified a number of struc-
tural principles in human cognitive systems that re-
late to the interface between LS and these other sys-
tems. Among the principles discovered is “the
whole–object constraint” (C
 
AREY
 
 1985). Children,
whatever their culture or language, apparently as-
sume as a default that nouns in general apply to
whole objects (e.g., a rabbit) and not to parts of the
object (e.g., a piece of a leg, a patch of fur, or spatially
separated patches of fur and pieces of leg), or the
object–and–its–environment. Children actually
have to learn that this is not always the case (just as
children have to learn that the shadow of an object
is not itself an object, S
 
PELKE
 
 et al. 1995). This appar-
ently ‘innate bias’ helps to solve the problem of rad-
ical indeterminacy of translation. Consider an an-
thropologist who visits an exotic tribe for the first
time and sees a member of that tribe pointing to
something that the anthropologist immediately
identifies as a running deer. The anthropologist is
fairly safe in assuming that the informant also
thought of pointing to a running deer (and not a
moving piece of deer, a shifting pattern of deer fur
and grass, etc.). This is so even if the informant also
believes that the deer is some other person’s ances-
tor. If this were not the case—if radical indetermi-
nacy were an omnipresent possibility—then anthro-
pology would be impossible and ethnography could
be 
 
only
 
 fiction.
Before learning to talk, children first learn to fol-
low gaze, engage in joint attention, contingently in-
teract with others to achieve goals, and so forth.
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Those who argue that language is acquired through
social interaction might be tempted to claim that
these facts undermine the modular model of lan-
guage (S
 
HANKER
 
 2001). Yet, most of the work in this
area—called the child’s ‘theory of mind’ or ‘folkpsy-
chology’–focuses on many of the same sorts of ques-
tions and approaches that generative grammarians
do: How is the child able to reliably 
 
infer
 
 such rich
mental structures about 
 
other minds
 
 from a few ges-
tures and without mastery of language? And how is
it that children also infer that people’s mental struc-
tures (intentions) can cause others to act a distance
(without any physical contact)? The emerging con-
sensus in the field is that children are biologically
endowed with a ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) that matures
in predictable ways over the first three years of life
(L
 
ESLIE
 
 1994; B
 
ARON
 
-C
 
OHEN
 
 1995; S
 
PELKE
 
 et al 1995).
Some features of developing ToM interface with ma-
turing features of developing LS in systematic ways
that are only now being experimentally studied. This
is one of the most exciting and productive research
areas in cognitive and developmental psychology (to
judge from journal publications and grant funding),
and also one of the most thoroughly ‘modular’. 
Interactions between modular cognitive systems
are complex and difficult to tease apart, perhaps
more so than interactions among various bodily sys-
tems. For example, belief in supernatural agents,
which characterizes all religions in all societies, in-
volves a host of modular expectations and interfac-
ing: folkmechanics, folkpsychology, folkbiology,
primary and secondary emotions, predator–prey
schema, and so forth (B
 
OYER
 
 1994; B
 
ARRETT
 
/N
 
YHOFF
 
2001; A
 
TRAN
 
 in press). Nevertheless, predictive theo-
ries are being proposed and empirically tested.
 
Are Modules Adaptations or 
Evolutionary By-Products of Adaptations?
 
Leading evolutionary biologists, such as Stephen
G
 
OULD
 
 and Richard L
 
EWONTIN
 
 (1979) describe the
products of higher-order human cognition as evolu-
tionary ‘by-products’ or ‘spandrels’. This is a stance
P&P adopt. A spandrel is an architectural term for
the structural form or space that arises as a necessary
concomitant to another decision in design, and is
not designed to have any direct utility in itself. For
example, the space beneath a flight of stairs is a by-
product of constructing an inclined stairway rather
than a vertical ladder. The fact that people might
subsequently use this ‘leftover’ space for storage
does not entail that the space was designed to be a
storage space. 
For G
 
OULD
 
 and L
 
EWONTIN
 
, higher-order human
cognitive structures originated as functionless span-
drels that have been subsequently modified under
cultural selection rather than natural selection. Bio-
logically functionless, or nearly functionless, span-
drels supposedly include: religion, writing, art, sci-
ence, commerce, war and play. These evolutionary
by-products are cultural ‘mountains’ to the biologi-
cally ‘adaptive molehill’ (G
 
OULD
 
 1991, pp58–59;
W
 
ILLIAMS
 
 1992, pp77–79). On this account, evolu-
tionary psychology would have little to reveal about
the emergence and structure of such culturally-elab-
orated spandrels: “The number and complexity of
these spandrels should increase with the intricacy of
the organism under consideration. In some region
within a spectrum of rising complexity, the number
and importance of useable and significant spandrels
will probably exceed the evolutionary import of the
primary adaptation” (G
 
OULD
 
 1997, pp10754–10755;
cf. F
 
ODOR
 
 1998). 
G
 
OULD
 
’s account of the emergence of distinctly
human cognitions as spandrels of a big brain is
hardly convincing. The very notion of a ‘big’ or
‘large’ or ‘complex’ brain is too vague to empirically
constrain the evolutionary story about how it might
have evolved. The big brain is taken as an adaptation
from which all cognitive spandrels arise. But an ad-
aptation to what? A design for what? What are its
evolutionary-relevant computational structures?
Big brain stories tend to be even broader in scope and
handwaving than language–evolution stories. Hu-
man brains supposedly broke away from ape brains
under selection pressures that run the gamut from
runaway social competition (A
 
LEXANDER
 
 1989), to
gut reduction (A
 
IELLO
 
/W
 
HEELER
 
 1995), to hunting
large game (H
 
ILL
 
 1999), to niche construction (L
 
A-
LAND
 
 et al. 2000), to runaway sexual selection
(M
 
ILLER
 
 2000), and so on. Alternatively, the big brain
primarily evolved as a conduit for culture (H
 
ARRIS
 
1975), as a vehicle for language (J
 
ERISON
 
 1976), or as
a host for the independently evolving ideas, or
‘memes,’ that compete to colonize it (D
 
ENNETT
 
 1995;
B
 
LACKMORE
 
 1999). Finally, the big brain may have
evolved under any number ‘positive feedback’ path-
ways involving some or all of the factors mentioned. 
But even if true, and even if we knew the reasons
(selection pressures responsible for) why, we are un-
likely to learn anything of particular interest from all
this about how the mind works. The notion of a big
brain is as uninformative about cognitive structures
and functions cognition as the notion of big body is
about bodily structures and functions. Never mind
exaptations, such as chins, or spandrels, such as
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palm lines. From the fact of a bigger body, what
could one possibly deduce about hearts, livers, kid-
neys, hands, faces, placentas and so on? And never
mind exaptations, such as language, or spandrels,
such as religion. From the fact of a bigger (or denser,
or more folded, or grayer) brain, what could one pos-
sibly deduce about perception, emotion, categoriza-
tion, inference or any of the other capabilities hu-
mans share with apes but in more vastly elaborated
form? Probably nothing at all.
It may well be true that little insight is to be gained
into higher-order human cognitive structures by
considering possible evolutionary origins and func-
tions. Adopting the hypothesis of G
 
OULD
 
 and
L
 
EWONTIN
 
 or P&P, which assumes this truth, is prac-
tically guaranteed to block insight, whether or not it
is true. By contrast, adopting evolutionary psychol-
ogy’s requirement that candidates for exaptations
and spandrels be described, as far as possible, with
reference to evolved adaptations, then it might be
possible to find out if the hypothesis is true or not.
If it is true, then evolutionary psychology would
have provided the empirical evidence that shows it
to be a significant and surprising scientific insight,
and not one that depends entirely on intuition, anal-
ogy, eloquence or wishful thinking. If it is not true,
then evolutionary psychology will have helped to
discover something new about human nature. 
 
Three Examples of Modularity: Naïve 
Mechanics, Theory of Mind, Folkbiology
 
Ever since C
 
HOMSKY
 
 jump-started the ‘cognitive rev-
olution,’ successors to the behaviorists who
believed in an all-powerful general thinking device
have tried to reconcile C
 
HOMSKY
 
’s insights with
faith in flexible intelligence by reluctantly granting
some specificity to language, and language alone.
But cognitive psychology today concentrates more
on discovery and exploration of domain-specific
mechanisms than on general-purpose computation.
Each such device has a particular ‘content-bias’ in
that it targets some particular domain of stimuli in
the world (‘set of inputs’): for example, the edges
and trajectories of rigid three-dimensional bodies
that move by physical contact between them
(mechanics), the contingent motion a self-pro-
pelled actors that can coordinate interactions with-
out having physical contact (agency), or the
behaviors and appearances of nonhuman living
creatures (species relations). The particular inferen-
tial structure of each domain-specific processor
then takes the isolated exemplars (or relatively poor
samples) of the stimulus-set actually encountered in
a person’s life, and spontaneously projects these rel-
atively fragmentary instances onto richly-struc-
tured categories (‘classes of output’) of general
relevance to our species: for example, the objects
and kinds of folkphysics (naïve mechanics),
folkpsychology (ToM) and folkbiology. Much work
on domain-specificity has developed, and now
develops, independently of sociobiology or evolu-
tionary psychology (ATRAN 1989; HIRSCHFELD 1996;
KEIL 1989; LESLIE 1994; CAREY/SPELKE 1994; SPERBER
1985).
Within the emerging paradigm of cognitive do-
main-specificity, there is much speculation and con-
troversy—again, as might be expected in any newly
emerging science. For example, there are competing
accounts of how human beings acquire basic knowl-
edge of the everyday biological world, including the
categorical limits of the biological domain and the
causal nature of its fundamental constituents. One
influential view of conceptual development in folk-
biology has been articulated by Susan CAREY and her
collaborators (CAREY 1985; CAREY/SPELKE 1994;
JOHNSON/CAREY 1998). On this view, young chil-
dren’s understanding of living things is embedded
in a folkpsychological, rather than folkbiological,
explanatory framework. Only by age 7 do children
begin to elaborate a specifically biological frame-
work of the living world, and only by age 10 does an
autonomous theory of biological causality emerge
that is not based on children’s understanding of how
humans think and behave. A competing view is that
folkbiology and folkpsychology emerge early in
childhood as largely independent domains of cogni-
tion that are clearly evident by ages 4 or 5, and which
may be innately differentiated (ATRAN 1987; KEIL
1989; GELMAN/WELLMAN 1991; HATANO/INAGAKI
1999). 
To address this issue, my colleagues and I carried
out a series of cross-cultural experiments (LÓPEZ et al
1997; MEDIN et al. 1997; ATRAN et al. 2001). One set
of experiments shows that by the age of 4–5 years
(the earliest age tested in this regard) urban Ameri-
can and Yukatek Maya children employ a concept of
innate species potential, or underlying essence, as an
inferential framework for understanding the affilia-
tion of an organism to a biological species, and for
projecting known and unknown biological proper-
ties to organisms in the face of uncertainty. Another
set of experiments shows that the youngest Maya
children do not have an anthropocentric under-
standing of the biological world. Children do not
initially need to reason about nonhuman living
Evolution and Cognition ❘ 6 ❘ 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1
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kinds by analogy to human kinds. The fact that
American children show anthropocentric bias ap-
pears to owe more to a difference in cultural expo-
sure to nonhuman biological kinds than to a basic
causal understanding of folkbiology per se. Together,
the first two sets of experiments suggest that folkpsy-
chology can’t be the initial source of folkbiology.
They also indicate that to master biological science,
people must learn to inhibit activation of universal
dispositions to view species essentialistically and to
see humans as inherently different from other ani-
mals (ATRAN 1990, 1998). 
A third set of results show that the same taxo-
nomic rank is cognitively preferred for biological in-
duction in two diverse populations: people raised in
the Midwestern USA and Itza’ Maya of the Lowland
Mesoamerican rainforest (ATRAN et al. 1997; COLEY
et al. 1997). This is the generic species—the level of
oak and robin. These findings cannot be explained by
domain-general models of similarity because such
models cannot account for why both cultures prefer
species-like groups in making inferences about the
biological world, although Americans have rela-
tively little actual knowledge or experience at this
level. In fact, general relations of perceptual similar-
ity and expectations derived from experience pro-
duce a ‘basic level’ of recognition and recall for many
Americans that corresponds to the superordinate
life-form level of folkbiological taxonomy—the level
of tree and bird (ROSCH et al. 1976). Still, Americans
prefer generic species for making inductions about
the distribution of biological properties among or-
ganisms, and for predicting the nature of the biolog-
ical world in the face of uncertainty. This supports
the idea of the generic-species level as a partitioning
of the ontological domains of plant and animal into
mutually exclusive essences that are assumed (but
not necessarily known) to have unique underlying
causal natures. The implication from these experi-
ments is that folkbiology may well represent an evo-
lutionary design: universal taxonomic structures,
centered on essence-based generic species, are argu-
ably routine products of our ‘habits of mind’, which
may be in part naturally selected to grasp relevant
and recurrent ‘habits of the world’.
Evidence for Modularity
The evolutionary argument for a naturally-selected
cognitive disposition, such as folkbiology, involves
converging evidence from a number of venues:
Functional design (analogy), ethology (homology),
universality, precocity of acquisition, independence
from perceptual experience (poverty of stimulus),
selective pathology (cerebral impairment), resis-
tance to inhibition (hyperactivity), and cultural
transmission. None of these criteria may be neces-
sary, but the presence of all or some is compelling, if
not conclusive. 
1. Functional Design. All organisms must function
to procure energy to survive, and they also must pro-
cure (genetic) information for recombination and
reproduction (ELDREDGE 1986). The first require-
ment is primarily satisfied by other species, and an
indiscriminate use of any individual of the other spe-
cies (e.g., energy-wise, it does not generally matter
which chicken or apple you eat). The second require-
ment is usually only satisfied by genetic information
unique to individual conspecifics (e.g., genetically,
it matters who is chosen as a mate and who is con-
sidered kin). On the one hand, humans recognize
other humans by individuating them with the aid of
species-specific triggering algorithms that ‘automat-
ically’ coordinate perceptual cues (e.g., facial recog-
nition schemata, gaze) with conceptual assumptions
(e.g., intentions) (BARON-COHEN 1995). On the other
hand, people do not spontaneously individuate the
members of other species in this way, but as exam-
plars of the (generic) species that identifies them as
causally belonging to only one essential kind.
Natural selection basically accounts only for the
appearance of complexly well-structured biological
traits that are designed to perform important func-
tional tasks of adaptive benefit to organisms. In gen-
eral, naturally selected adaptations are structures
functionally “perfected for any given habit” (DAR-
WIN 1883, p140), having “very much the appearance
of design by an intelligent designer… on which the
wellbeing and very existence of the organism de-
pends” (WALLACE 1901, p138). Plausibly, the univer-
sal appreciation of generic species as the causal foun-
dation for the taxonomic arrangement of
biodiversity, and for taxonomic inference about the
distribution of causally-related properties that un-
derlie biodiversity, is one such functional evolution-
ary adaptation. But a good story is not enough.1
2. Ethology. One hallmark of adaptation is a phylo-
genetic history that extends beyond the species in
which the adaptation is perfected: for example,
ducklings crouching in the presence of hawks, but
not other kinds of birds, suggests dedicated mecha-
nisms for something like species recognition. Some
nonhuman species can clearly distinguish several
different animal or plant species (CERELLA 1979;
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LORENZ 1966; HERRNSTEIN 1984). Vervet monkeys
even have distinct alarm calls for different predator
species or groups of species: snake, leopard and chee-
tah, hawk eagle, and so forth (HAUSER 2000). Chim-
panzees may have rudimentary hierarchical group-
ings of biological groups within groups (BROWN/
BOYSEN in press). To be sure, the world itself is nei-
ther chaos nor flux: species are often locally self-
structuring entities that are reproductively and eco-
logically isolated from other species through natural
selection. But there is no a priori reason for the mind
to always focus on categorizing and relating species
qua species, unless doing so served some adaptive
function (e.g., it makes little difference which tiger
could eat a person or which mango a person could
eat). And the adaptive functions of organisms rarely,
if ever, evolve or operate in nature as all-purpose
mechanisms. 
3. Universality. Ever since the pioneering work of
BERLIN and his colleagues, evidence from ethnobiol-
ogy and experimental psychology has been accumu-
lating that all human societies have similar folkbio-
logical structures (BERLIN et al. 1973; BERLIN 1992;
ATRAN 1990, 1999). These striking cross-cultural sim-
ilarities suggest that a small number of organizing
principles universally define folkbiological systems.
Basic aspects of folkbiological structure (e.g., taxo-
nomic ranking, primacy of generic-species) seem to
vary little across cultures as a function of theories or
belief systems.
4. Ease of Acquisition. Acquisition studies indicate
a precocious emergence of essentialist folkbiological
principles in early childhood that are not applied to
other domains (GELMAN/WELLMAN 1991; KEIL 1994;
HATANO/INAGAKI 1999; ATRAN et al. 2001). 
5. Independence from Perceptual Experience.
Experiments on inferential processing show that
that humans do not make biological inductions pri-
marily on the basis of perceptual experience or any
general similarity-based metric, but on the basis of
imperceptible causal expectations of a peculiar, es-
sentialist nature (ATRAN et al 1997; COLEY et al 1997).
6. Pathology. Cerebral impairments (WILLIAMS syn-
drome, brain lesions caused by certain types of her-
pes virus, etc.) suggest selective retention or loss of
folkbiological taxonomies or of particular taxo-
nomic ranks. Neuropsychological studies have re-
ported a pathological performance in recognition at
the life-form and generic-species levels (e.g., recog-
nizing an item as an animal but not as a bird or
robin), and dissociation at the life-form level (e.g.,
not recognizing items as trees). Existing studies,
however, do not say anything about the generic-spe-
cies rank as the preferred level of representation for
reasoning, perhaps because of methodology (linked
to averaging over items and failure to include sets of
generic species) (WARRINGTON/SHALLICE 1984; SAR-
TORI/JOB 1988; JOB/SURIAN 1998).
7. Inhibition and Hyperactivity. One characteris-
tic of an evolved cognitive disposition is evident dif-
ficulty in inhibiting its operation (HAUSER 2000).
Consider beliefs in biological essences. Such beliefs
greatly help people explore the world by prodding
them to look for regularities and to seek explana-
tions of variation in terms of underlying patterns.
This strategy may help bring order to ordinary cir-
cumstances, including those relevant to human sur-
vival. But in other circumstances, such as wanting to
know what is correct or true for the cosmos at large,
such intuitively ingrained concepts and beliefs may
hinder more than help. For example, the essentialist
bias to understand variation in terms of deviance is
undoubtedly a hindrance to evolutionary thinking.
In some everyday matters, the tendency to essential-
ize or explain variation in terms of deviation from
some essential ideal or norm (e.g., people as mental
or biological ‘deviants’) can be an effortlessly ‘natu-
ral’ but wrong way to think. 
Because intuitive notions come to us so naturally
they may be difficult to unlearn and transcend. Even
students and philosophers of biology often find it
difficult to abandon commonsense notions of species
as classes, essences or natural kinds in favor of the
concept of species as a logical individual—a genealog-
ical branch whose endpoints are somewhat arbi-
trarily defined in the phyletic tree and whose status
does not differ in principle for that of other smaller
(variety) and larger (genus) branches. Similarly, rac-
ism—the projection of biological essences onto social
groups—seems to be a cognitively facile and cultur-
ally universal tendency (HIRSCHFELD 1996). Although
science teaches that race is biologically incoherent,
racial or ethnic essentialism is as notoriously difficult
to suppress as it is easy to incite (GIL-WHITE 2001).
8. Cultural Transmission. Human cultures favor a
rapid selection and stable distribution of those ideas
that: 1) readily help to solve relevant and recurrent
environmental problems, 2) are easily memorized
and processed by the human brain, and 3) facilitate
the retention and understanding of ideas that are
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more variable (e.g ., religion) or difficult to learn
(e.g., science) but contingently useful or important.
Folkbiological taxonomy readily aids humans every-
where in orienting themselves and surviving in the
natural world. Its content tends to be stable within
cultures (high interinformant agreement, substan-
tial historical continuity) and its structure isomor-
phic across cultures (BERLIN et al. 1973; LÓPEZ et al.
1997). Folkbiological taxonomy also serves as a prin-
cipled basis for transmission and acquisition of more
variable and extended forms of cultural knowledge,
such as certain forms of religious and scientific belief
(ATRAN 1990, 1998). 
Consider, for example, the spontaneous emer-
gence of totemism—the correspondence of social
groups with generic species—at different times and
in different parts of the world. Why, as LÉVI-STRAUSS
(1963) aptly noted, are totems so “good to think”?
In part, totemism uses representations of generic
species to represent groups of people; however, this
pervasive metarepresentational inclination argu-
ably owes its recurrence to its ability to ride piggy-
back on folkbiological taxonomy. Generic species
and groups of generic species are inherently well-
structured, attention-arresting, memorable and
readily transmissible across minds. As a result, they
readily provide effective pegs on which to attach
knowledge and behavior of less intrinsically well-
determined social groups. In this way totemic groups
can also become memorable, attention-arresting
and transmissible across minds. These are the condi-
tions for any idea to become culturally viable (see
SPERBER 1996 for a general view of culture along the
lines of an ‘epidemiology of representations’). A sig-
nificant feature of totemism that enhances both
memorability and its capacity to grab attention is
that it violates the general behavior of biological spe-
cies: members of a totem, unlike members of a ge-
neric species, generally do not interbreed, but only
mate with members of other totems in order to cre-
ate a system of social exchange. Notice that this vio-
lation of core knowledge is far from arbitrary. In fact,
it is such a pointed violation of human beings’ intu-
itive ontology that it readily
mobilizes most of the assump-
tions people ordinarily make
about biology in order to bet-
ter help build societies around
the world (ATRAN/SPERBER
1991). 
In brief, modularized struc-
tures—such as those which
produce folkmechanical, folk-
psychological and folkbiological concepts—are spe-
cial players in cultural evolution. Their native stabil-
ity derivatively attaches to more variable and
difficult–to–learn representational forms, thus en-
hancing the latter’s prospects for regularity and re-
currence in transmission within and across cultures.
This includes knowledge that cumulatively enriches
(e.g., to produce folk expertise), overrides (e.g., to
produce religious belief) or otherwise transcends
(e.g., to produce science) the everyday ontology pre-
scribed by our evolved cognitive modules. 
Conclusion: Neither Sin nor Salvation, 
but a Promissory Note.
Despite the initial independence of work in domain-
specificity, there is now increasing convergence in
the ways cognitive anthropologists and psycholo-
gists, and evolutionary biologists and psychologists,
think about related issues. The general consensus is
that domain-specific mechanisms likely evolved
over millions of years of biological and cognitive
evolution to deal with specific sorts of relevant and
recurrent problems in ancestral environments (‘task
demands’), such as recognizing inert objects (e.g.,
rocks), reducing biodiversity to causally manageable
proportions (e.g., species), or anticipating agents
(e.g., the intentions of potential predators or prey).
In the computer lingo that now dominates the field,
the ‘computational mind’ consists of a variety of dis-
tinct, task-specific information-processing devices.
Nothing from work on subcortical emotions or neo-
cortical principles of general association has pro-
vided, or hints at providing, the slightest insight
into the cognitive structures and processes discov-
ered so far in these emerging fields.
Evolutionary psychology is still in its infancy
and is not yet the new scientific paradigm some
would love and others hate. Some find the idea of
‘Stone Age Minds for a Space Age World’ bold and
irreverent, many find it false and demeaning, oth-
ers find it ridiculous. As the field stands now, all
may garner uncertain support for their position.
This new field surely will not
solve all of the problems its
fervent supporters say it will.
But neither will it face the
massive road blocks to under-
standing that its unrelenting
detractors see at every turn. At
present, the field is a promis-
sory note, much as DARWIN’s
theory was at its beginning. 
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Little by little, biologists were able to deliver on
DARWIN’s promises. This process has speeded up con-
siderably—almost irreversibly—thanks to access at
the molecular level. There is still a long way to go.
Through recent advances in cognitive science, evo-
lutionary psychology has gained entrance to mental
structure, and so potentially to the brain’s evolved
neural architecture. It has an even longer way ahead:
much less is currently known about how the mind/
brain works than how body cells function. Perhaps,
in the end, evolutionary psychology’s interpreta-
tions of complex mental designs as telltale signs of
ancient environments will prove no truer than phre-
nology’s readings of bumps and other conforma-
tions of the skull as indications of mental faculties
and character (phrenology was a very serious and
hotly debated discipline a century ago). Then again
perhaps not, which makes the effort worthwhile.
Note
1 Although the adaptive relationship of structure to function
is often manifest, as with the giraffe’s neck or the rhinocer-
us’s horns, often it is not. In such cases, evolutionary the-
orists adopt a strategy of ‘reverse engineering’. Reverse
engineering is what military analysts do when a weapon
from an enemy or competitor in the arms market falls into
their hands and they try to figure out exactly how it was
put together and what it can do. Reverse engineering is
easiest, of course, if the structure contains some signature
of its function, like trying to figure out what a toaster does
given the telltale sign of toasted bread crumbs left inside.
But in many cases recognizing the appropriate signs already
requires some prior notion of what function the structure
may have served. Thus, after a century and a half of debate,
it is only now that scientists clearly favor the hypothesis
that bipedality was primarily selected to enhance field of
view. Comparative studies of humans with bipedal birds
and dinosaurs, as well as experiments comparing energy
expenditure and running speed in two-footed versus four-
footed running and walking, appear to exclude the compet-
ing hypotheses that bipedality evolved for running or en-
ergy conservation. For most higher-order human cognitive
faculties, however, there may be little useful comparative
evidence from elsewhere in the animal kingdom. This is
because of their apparent structural novelty, poor represen-
tation in the fossil record (e.g., stone tools tell little of lan-
guae or theory of mind) and lack of surviving intermediate
forms. The moral is that reverse engineering can be helpful,
and occasionally successful, but success is by no means
guaranteed even in the richest of evidentiary contexts. 
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